Weronika Książek: A parliamentary election is scheduled for the upcoming fall in Poland. How is the Center for the Study of Democracy preparing for this event? For many years, the Center has been carrying out research as part of the General Election Study (PGSW), so this year will be especially busy in that respect. Please tell us more about this study. What do you research?
Professor Mikołaj Cześnik The study has been ongoing since 1997. Its genesis goes back even further, to the 1995 Polish presidential election. In fact, at the beginning the study was called “Polish General Election Survey”. For decades, Professor Radosław Markowski was the Principal Investigator in this study. In the current edition, the baton was passed to me.
In the PGSW project, we are mainly interested in the parliamentary elections to the lower chamber (pol. Sejm), while elections to the higher chamber, the Senate, are of a lesser interest to us. We try to answer the following questions: Why did people vote a certain way in a given election? Why did they choose this party over another one? Why did some people go voting first thing in the morning, while others did not go at all? We research attendance, character, source, and nature of voting preferences. We also answer questions about party identification, satisfaction with democracy and political agency, about views on certain social issues that constitute hot topics of a given electoral campaign (e.g. migration, taxes, social benefits, abortion, and the European Union).
Can we expect a game-changing election? Game-changing in terms of turnout and voters mobilization? Do you have any indications in that respect or is it rather an unknown?
Will it be a game-changer? We will find out soon. For sure, the election will be very significant. As citizens, we are facing a very serious decision. Either we give power to the Law and Justice (PiS) party for the subsequent third term (which would be a record, at least in the so-called Third Polish Republic (ed. in Poland of the post-Soviet era), or we will take that power away. Many configurations are possible.
If we see the renewal of mandate for PiS, it may provide an additional fuel for initiatives of this party, which have not met with the approval of everyone in Poland.
Another option is that we will see some kind of renewal of the pre-2015 order. There is no doubt, that in some respects, the Civic Platform (PO), the Polish People’s Party (PSL), the Left or the Szymon Hołownia party have different visions of the Republic of Poland than the Law and Justice party. Please note that we are talking here not only about social and economic issues, but also about the political system...
The political system? Why?
During a meeting with the party supporters in Janów Lubelski, the leader of the Law and Justice party, Jarosław Kaczyński, clearly stated that Law and Justice has been changing Poland, among other things by changing the political system (quote: “In 2015, we have begun changing the political system in Poland.”). This indicates that the leader of PiS is aware that the changes have gone much further than the mandate given to the party by citizens of Poland both in 2015 and 2019, allows. Considering only this one statement by the Chairman Kaczyński, the results of the fall election will indicate citizens’ decision whether they want this type of system to perpetuate. Nowadays, there is no indication that the Law and Justice party should enjoy a landslide victory and, as a result, gain a formal approval to change the system. I’d say we could count on 5, 6, maybe 7 million of votes. Of course, a lot is riding on the voters turnout and how many votes will others get, because the same 6 million may mean a landslide victory or a Pyrrhic victory, depending on the context.
And what scenario seems to be most likely?
No clear winner among the fractions. What does it mean? It means that both, PiS and the anti-PiS coalition may gain over 200 mandates each, and Confederation will have the swing vote with 20 or 30 mandates. Then many, not so obvious options become possible (let’s not forget that in 2005 we were convinced that it would be the Civic Platform and PiS, who would form the government; meanwhile, PiS formed a coalition government with the League of Polish Families (LPR) and the Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (ed. a political party representing rural interests). We could imagine a minority government, various coalitions formed ad hoc... Of course, a government of this type would be unstable and could culminate in a snap election.
I must admit that I am asking about this potential “game-changer” in the context of a study carried out by Professor Ben Stanley from the Center for the Study of Democracy, who investigates how Poles assess changes that have been ongoing in Poland since 2015. How do Poles, representing different electorates, assess the state of democracy in the country?
People who have been voting for the Law and Justice party since 2011 are very happy. This group is organically conjoined with PiS. A large percentage of this electorate consists of people who previously were very poorly looked after, or not looked after at all by the Republic of Poland. Support for social benefit programs is correlated with support for PiS, because these programs mean appreciation of these people, combined with a narration about agency. Health care is still failing, and pensions, despite the “13th payment” (ed. an additional, 13th pension in a year introduced by PiS in 2019), are still low, however nobody tells pensioners to their faces that it would be better for the state budget if they died. Moreover, there is an additional psychological effect of creating a “you owe us” situation: gifting someone with something is a significant social act, which has been studied for years by anthropologists.
As far as the people who are not part of the PiS die-hard electorate but feel affinity with the party in axiological matters are concerned, then looking at the results post the 2015 and 2019 elections, they are characterized by a belief that “common people” are noble and good but the “bad” elites lead them astray or want to harm them. They also tend to oversimplify and are convinced that all matters, which politicians present as complicated, are in fact simple. In 2015, supporters of PiS were the most populist of all electorates. But interestingly, in 2019, they were least populist! Which means that their outlook on socio-political situation has changed and perhaps, they began to notice all those nuances they had not seen before.
Besides, we must remember that party electorates are diverse in matters such as media consumption. And after all, there are also electoral ghettos on the other sides of the political scene.
Is it another important change that could impact the results of the upcoming election?
Certainly. We negotiate reality through communication mechanisms resulting from interactions. Together we agree upon meanings – what is good, what is bad, disgraceful, prudent, wise, and what is stupid. When there is lack of interaction, we begin speaking in different tongues and there is no understanding between us; and when there is no understanding, then “agora”, understood not as a physical place, but as a designated space where we all can meet and exchange views and opinions, disappears. Nowadays, almost nothing is common for Poles.
For example, once we questioned whether the “Rywin scandal” was a scandal. These days, what is a scandal for some, is not a scandal for others. Currently, a social definition of “scandal” is much more fluid than 20 years ago, and for every political party it means something else. And this is also characteristic for all processes in our communication sphere: we have stopped talking to each other, we have stopped listening to each other, we avoid confrontation with views that are completely different than ours, and we reduce cognitive dissonance. We can afford it, because we can freely choose what we want to watch and what we want to listen to.
An average media consumer has no tools for the verification of information. Of course these tools exist, but they require time and skills (e.g., critical thinking, extended research). Technological advancement, which increasingly keeps us in information bubbles, is not conducive to such verification. Different narrations, generated by different media outlets, reach polarized media consumers. Less and less definitions and meanings are agreed upon commonly. And this problem is not just specific to Poland. What has been happening in the United States, France and many other places in the world, indicates that this is a universal process. I don’t know how to stop it, however as a researchers of elections, I am obliged to observe it carefully.
The 2021 report “The State in the Social Consciousness of Poles”, published by Professor Radosław Markowski and Piotr Zagórski, Ph.D., indicates that Poles’ attitudes towards their country are not cohesive, but they are rather politically determined, especially by party affiliation. In other words, Poles are divided between the supporters of the current state and “the rest”. According to the report, supporters of the current government declare a greater satisfaction with the way the state operates (including the state’s invigilation potential) than non-supporters. In this group only one in five people declares dislike of the state, while close to 75 percent of those displeased with democracy in Poland indicates negative attitude towards the state. In the current specific political situation, are we still able to research attitudes towards the state in general, or are we predetermined to research the PiS state?
PiS has worked very hard to “merge” with the state. In their narration, the state was once “seized” by hostile comprador elites. And now, the state has risen from its knees and shares the money, which has been taken from the bad ones and transferred to the good ones. Of course on the one hand, one can flinch at that crude narration, on the other hand, there is much to indicate that that narration works.
A small methodological comment: data, which Zagórski and Markowski refer to, is a very wide dragnet but with pretty large holes, which lets through a lot of very significant but small pieces of information. I think that their results should be complemented by a solid qualitative study. I don’t know how to do it, because qualitative research is not my domain, but I think that these mechanisms discussed by our researchers can be captured more precisely.
In general, Poles do not have an overly positive opinion about their state. Trust in each other, trust in political parties, in the state, institutions and in parliament has always been a problem in our country and it can be explained by our history. We must remember that for over 200 years, the state, for us, took on a form of a foreign aggressor, and it was seldom ours. Whereas, data from the latest European Social Survey indicates that this trust has been additionally undermined by the pandemic and later by the war.
In 2015, the Polish General Election Study indicated that close to 21 percent of voters approved of a “strong hand” government. How does it look like today? To what degree are Polish citizens confirmed democrats and how much are they willing to acquiesce to “alternative” solutions?
A “strong hand” governance does not always mean oppression. A stern father, if he is fair, exudes safety. Of course, he can be brusque. He simply sets boundaries in such a way that life with him is convenient – you don’t have to think too much. And in some situations, strong leadership is simply a necessity, because when there is a fire, it is hard to imagine that we would sit together and democratically deliberate about what needs to be done.
We know from psychologists that different people possess different predispositions. Some people like stronger boundaries, while others prefer looser ones. It seems that the first group might like the “strong hand” rule.
Yes, it does happen that we agree to illiberal and undemocratic solutions as a price to pay for effectiveness and efficient governance. These days, this type of rule is more often accepted by those who were disenfranchised before.
Do you mean those that lost on the post-soviet transformation?
Yes. The people, who in that new reality stood at the start line and it turned out that instead of running shoes they were wearing flippers. So running was very uncomfortable for them, and as a result they got left behind. Those who had proper running shoes pushed forward. The state did nothing to help. It just stood on the sidelines like a referee who shrugs and explains that “this one is more talented than that one”. But the talent was not the only factor. The “faster runners” had different capital, inherited or gained during the soviet-rule era (PRL). That capital had different forms. Someone had an opportunity to learn English from his/her uncle, someone else, overnight became an owner of a shop, a cement factory or a formerly State-owned Agricultural Farm (PGR), which he or she was the head of before the transformation.
We know from research that the political assessment of the past eight years differs from the assessment of the events, which took place between 1989 and 2015, and it is closely related to social stratification. Those that voted for Law and Justice feel that their situation has significantly improved. And it has improved, because the new government not only gave them running shoes, but also said: “Listen, you may run one lap less”.
Let’s not kid ourselves – people who can’t make ends meet, won’t be concerned about the quality of air or melting icebergs at the North Pole. They couldn’t care less about the Attorney General, the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Tribunal, as long as they regularly receive cash from the government. This is the Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs.
An afterthought may come with time...
In the long run, it will occur for sure – PiS has not been able to avoid the process of oligarchization and refrain from treating the state as the spoils of war, which is natural for political parties. I do not want to engage in over-psychologization (there are many specialists in this field at SWPS University, and I am not one of them), but Kaczyński (ed. leader of PiS), since the beginning, has not been hiding the fact that he needs new elites.
In 2021, Professor Ben Stanley published an article in “Cambridge University Press”, which discussed similarities between the processes of democratic backsliding in Poland and Hungary. It indicated ideological roots of both processes, where “populism and nativism” play a significant role. What else does Poland have in common with Hungary?
For sure, both Jarosław Kaczyński and Victor Orban have an excellent understanding such “election winning technology” that does not require convincing absolutely everyone about voting for their party. They know that sometimes you win elections by actually gaining less votes than your opponent (this is also the case of Donald Trump). But this is where the similarities end.
Firstly, Orban has been in power for a longer time. Secondly, he has a much larger social base – he has managed to go beyond the lower classes. Fidesz also enjoys strong support among the middle class. This, among other things, is the reason why Orban wins elections with 48-50 percent of votes, while quite regularly winning definite majority of mandates, sometimes constitutional ones, in the parliament.
Despite all that, Law and Justice is definitely a different party than Fidesz. Orban’s party is simply a more effective organization, better organized, with a huge sense of a group interest.
But they are similar in their negative attitude towards the EU.
Far from it. There are more differences than similarities here. PiS preaches anti-EU narration lacking the understanding that in fact, the European Union is a huge battle field of competing interests, while Orban understand this very well. Fidesh collaborated closely with Angela Merkel’s party and was a crucial element of the European People’s Party (EPP). Orban used to attend conventions of the Christian Social Union (CSU) in Bavaria. He travels a lot, speaks several foreign languages, is a man of the world (let’s not forget that the George Soros Foundation funded a scholarship for him to attend Oxford!), and he is well connected. On daily bases, he operates in a rather hermetic environment, however it is still a different environment from that in which the leader of PiS operates. I keep repeating that Kaczyński was socialized, also politically, in the 1960s. Moreover, he is probably not interested in anything else but Poland. He even spends his holidays only as far as the West Pomeranian region (north-west Poland). Of course, journalists who sympathize with him, can present it as a certain virtue, however, we should remember that contemporary Poland does not exist in a vacuum. Events that happen around the world impact us directly. Our leaders need to understand geopolitics well, visit other countries, and be inspired by solutions that these countries have introduced.
In a nutshell, even with his nonconforming attitude, Orban is a politician of a different breed. He is able to act much more effectively, faster (as much in good as in bad cause), and more frequently presents his partners (also European ones) with a fait accompli. Meanwhile, our government can be cowardly, back down of its ideas, when rebuked by the United States, Israel or the European Union. I can count in one breath a few, if not several different projects, on which PiS simply surrendered, such as TVN (American-owned private television station in Poland), the Just Act 447, and the administrative division of the Mazovia district.
Are we able to predict, who will most likely stay at home this year, and who will vote at the polling stations? And will this involve different groups than usual?
There are certain regularities that we have been observing in the Polish society. There is a sizable group of citizens who participate in elections only if something especially surprises or entices them. Some are drawn by something positive, others by negative (e.g., something that Paweł Kukiz [ed. a former rock musician turned politician] called “a royal fu***ing fury”, and Marta Lempart [ed. a leftist activist] invoked the same emotions).
Studies and analysis based on previously collected data, which are to tell us who and how to motivate, have been already ongoing. I am convinced that we will see a calming communication from Law and Justice, addressed to their most valued electorate, by which I mean Polish rural voters, but also other groups, which know how to protect their interests in exchange for votes (e.g. miners, railway employees, etc.).
So these groups usually vote?
Yes, indeed.
And who can we find in the group of the disillusioned? Are there any class differences there, too?
For sure. With its policy PiS has created a phenomenon. It empowered some parts of the society in such a way that people who earlier felt that their voting rights were fictional, now feel that they are citizens fully entitled to exercise all the rights owed to them. Apart from this phenomenon, for years we have been observing some simple and rather similar correlations: the higher people are situated in the social hierarchy, the more willing they are to vote, the lower they are situated, the less willingly they are to participate in the electoral process.
Is there a group that votes against? People who don’t have a favorite, they don’t vote for someone specific, but turn out to vote against PiS or against PO or against Confederation. What has your research been showing in this matter over the years?
For a long time, this has been a widespread emotion and a strong determinant of participation in the electoral process. Although our most recent data is from 2019, there is no indication that the trend is going to change. In our questionnaires we ask: “Do you feel real dislike or anger towards any of the political parties?” And if someone answers “yes” to this question, then...
Then they would probably vote against.
Yes, 99 percent sure that this is how they would vote. Sometimes we also ask: “Do you think that a party X should be delegalized?” – and of course here the percentage of “yeses” is smaller, however, we are usually able to point out a group that does not accept certain actors of the political scene and expresses a desire for some of the parties to disappear. We do not ask what their reasons are. Perhaps at some point we could do it.
How is it in other European countries? Do negative emotions motivate people to vote only in Poland? Or is it a global phenomenon?
This is not characteristic only for Poland. We live in such a moment in history when everyone is stressed, overtired, filled with fear and anger. Therefore dislike or anger motivate people to go voting.
What is the role of social movements in the process of democratization in Poland as compared with the rest of the continent? To what degree do grassroots initiatives influence parliamentary policies?
For example, our Youth Research Center examined the Women’s Strike and youth protests of 2020. Of course, it was a kind of a phenomenon, a movement ignited by a certain outrage, nevertheless it seems that currently it will have no impact on the election.
The rural party Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland party, whose narration our researchers have been researching (“From Samoobrona (Self-Defense) to Agrounia: rural social movements in Poland post 1989” – a project led by Professor Michał Wenzel) also grew from an outrage of a specific social group, and yet it did impact not only the results of an election, but it also shaped Poland’s political landscape.
Indeed, however Self-Defense was not founded during a pandemic (we can’t forget that people attending the recent protests broke the pandemic rules and restrictions). And the cause of the Women’s Strike was slightly different than that of the Self-Defense party...
I think that for now, there are no good ideas for harnessing the sentiments of such movements as the Women’s Strike, be it politically, electorally or by political parties. Nevertheless, these movements certainly change social climate as does the rapid decline in the observance of religious practices by Poles. I am convinced that these movements will resonate with us for a long time and they will constitute a significant civic experience for some young people.
How do young people vote nowadays? Differently than, for example, a decade ago? Could their votes become swing votes?
I wouldn’t overestimate that power. Nowadays, young people constitute a relatively small group. Generations that gain voting rights this year are rather small. For example, the 1983 generation was twice as big as the 2003 generation. Moreover, 20-somethings are not very eager to vote, they have their whole lives to do it (although, I must admit that the percentage of young people who vote nowadays is bigger than 20 years ago). Political actors know this very well.
But pensioners – they are a different story! Mobilization of pensioners will bring a better effect than mobilization of young people. There are many more pensioners than young adults, because over the past 20 years the average life span has increased and PiS has lowered the retirement age. Pensioners may provide additional reserves for the current government, if the administration firstly takes care of health care and secondly, the social benefits. For example, if the government ensures that pension are paid out on time, and perhaps it will add a 15th or even a 16th pension per year.
Apart from this bonus payment, pensioners, as opposed to young people, often ask themselves: “What is my assessment of the past eight years?”. There are many more conservative and religious people in that age group. Therefore, a battle for the 60+ electorate may be very difficult for the opposition. Retirement changes one’s life situation overnight and makes people much more reliant on the state, because it is the state who provides pensions. And the state might not pay out that benefit, might blackmail pensioners.... or it might give them a present, like PiS does. This type of present can be easily “sold” as “Jarek’s gift” (ed. Jarek is a diminutive of Jarosław, the first name of Law and Justice‘s leader). Of course, not everyone will buy this. The clue of the matter is to ensure that enough people buy it to get their votes.
Let’s talk about the voter turnout... In other European countries, such as Germany or Spain, voters turnout during parliamentary elections may reach close to 70 percent. Why is it usually much lower in Poland? What do you think about fines for voter absenteeism imposed by the state as a remedy? For example, this type of a solution has been in place since the 19th century in Belgium.
Several years ago, I wrote an article ("Is compulsory voting a remedy? Evidence from the 2001 Polish parliamentary elections"), which indicated that even if we introduced mandatory voting, punishable by fines, in Poland, the election results practically would not change and the division of votes among the remaining electorate would be exactly the same as in the general population. When we ask in our surveys: “What would you do if voter absenteeism was punishable by a fine”, 6-7 percent of responders answer that they would still stay at home and not vote.
The probability of such legislation being introduced is very small. Political parties are not necessarily interested in an additional 10-20 percent of voters to take care of, because it means increased costs of electoral campaigns. Besides, attending to those who have decided to join the electoral market for the first time requires slightly different tools.
Is it because they have already been disappointed with something and parties need to somehow address it?
Yes, parties must talk differently to this group, wow them on TikTok, or even better – present them with an offer. But to present them with an offer, one must have a diagnosis. And this cannot be done for free. So the party needs even more money. And this is how the cycle ends.
How does it look like in the European Union? In France or Germany? Voters turnout is usually significant there.
Considering the last presidential election in Poland, in 2015, when close to two thirds of those entitled to vote cast their ballots, the result was not that different from the turnout in Italy, France or Germany, where on the other hand, the turnout has been declining. It has been declining, because Europeans are disappointed with democracy. Perhaps for other reasons than we are, but over there we also witness a clash of populist movements on the one side, and supporters of liberal democracy on the other.
In the past, Poland was very different from the rest of Europe in this regards. In the 1990s and at the beginning of 2000s, voters turnout was at 50 percent, nowadays it oscillates around 55-60 percent. For the upcoming election I would estimate the turnout to be between 56 and 58 percent. Not a disaster. I am concerned with a different phenomenon, which has been inherited from the Communist era, when Solidarity encouraged Poles to boycott the election as the only right solution in the situation when “there is nobody to vote for”. Poles took this to heart, perhaps too much, and this option resonates nowadays. We often opt for a boycott, because it is easier than going out and voting, as it should be done in democracy. This is also related to general detestation of politics.
How does this detestation relate to trust towards politicians and institutions?
Around the world? Lately, this trust has been declining, of course. For example, in some Scandinavian countries it has been happening mainly due to the discontent with migration and disinformation. Russia and China certainly play an important role in the global process of diminishing trust towards politicians and political institutions.
In Poland, trust is not declining, but only because the trust level has been very low for a long time. Similar processes are currently ongoing in the United States. The American system has been generating huge inequalities for as many as 30-40 years. The middle class is getting poorer while the richest are getting richer. This also diminishes trust in the system which not so long ago provided opportunities for career paths from a shoe shiner to a millionaire. Nowadays, it is nearly impossible. Contemporary Capitalism is becoming increasingly hermetic.
Nowadays, the whole European community experiences the lack of trust towards political parties and institutions. The problems Europe is currently facing, such as climate change, immigration, and growing social inequality, spark discussions, disagreements and polarization.
How can we overcome this crisis. How long will it take?
Our ActEU project, which comprises 12 European universities, including SWPS University, investigates how this decline in trust impacts voting, especially the results that may prove to be dangerous to democracy, in other words the support for populists who would like to change a political system into a system governed by referenda or even a dictatorship.
In this project, SWPS University collaborates closely with the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, in Greece. Our first task will be to map the trust trends in Europe. We know that important aspects of this crisis include erosion and redefinition of interpersonal relations resulting from 50 years of capitalist economy. Inequalities have been growing very rapidly over the past several years. Moreover, we have not finished with colonialism, quite the contrary. For example, many countries in Africa and South-East Asia still pay extra so that the European commonwealth could enjoy cheap food. One could even venture an opinion that we are blocking the development of agriculture in those regions. If the EU abandoned common agricultural policy, we would be fed by Egypt, Morocco, Tunis, Libya or Algeria.
The main beneficiaries of EU’s current agricultural policy are the French. Therefore, they can afford to maintain small and expensive farms, which must be subsidized externally. Of course, their products are of excellent quality, however, we should remember that it does not happen just like that, but it is possible for the price of limiting free market and the price of duties that for example, block the flow of Moroccan or Egyptian products.
Actually, Poland was lucky because it has joined the global economy, while simply being its beneficiary.
To conclude our conversation, I would like to ask a question we pose to all researchers in the series. If you and the Institute of Social Sciences had unlimited funds, what research dreams would you like to realize? What would you like to achieve in your discipline?
I dream about a large comparative study that would examine changes in political systems over many years, in very different cultural and historical contexts. If I could gather a team of historians, anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, economists, geographers, and probably a few more specialists, I would research what has happened to us over the last several decades, comparing this with the process in Taiwan, Mexico, Argentine, South Africa, and other African countries. For sure, in my comparative research, I would also include the East – recently, China has been undergoing a huge transformation. We would need to carry out a cross-sectional study, encompassing both time and space.
Thank you for your time.
Weronika Książek
Projects referenced in the interview:
Read more about the projects mentioned in the interview in the following publications::